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Abstract 
Using a spatial competition model, this paper considers the conditions under 
which a monopoly manufacturer will introduce an e-channel, and its effect on 
consumer surplus and social welfare. We find that the e-channel will be introduced 
only if the transportation cost is high and the delivery cost is low. Second, if only some 
of the consumers buy the good from the retail outlets and the delivery cost is certainly 
high, the introduction will not decrease any consumer’s surplus and the Pareto 
efficiency can be realized. Third, the social welfare will be improved when the 
delivery cost is low.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
    The rapid development of information technology has let to widespread use of 
the internet. Consequently, the number of online transactions (also referred to as 
electronic commerce or e-commerce) has increased significantly since the 
mid-1990s. According to “An Investigation of Current Status and Market Size of 
Electronic Commerce (EC) during the fiscal year H18” conducted by the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry, the Japanese e-commerce market was worth 152 
trillion yen in 2006. Furthermore, the share of consumer segment of e-commerce 
(BtoC) in total retail sales was 2.03% in Japan and 4.37% in the U.S.    
    There are two types of retailers in the consumer goods e-commerce market; pure 
e-retailers who only sell the goods online and retailers who sell the goods both online 
and offline. In recent years, the number of retailers who sell goods both online and 
offline has increased dramatically1. In this paper, we use the term “e-retailer” to refer 
to both regardless of whether or not they own a real outlet. Moreover, we try to clarify 
how a manufacturer should construct his distribution channel in a setting where 
conventional outlet retailer (i.e., retailers who do not sell the goods online) and 
e-retailer coexist and the impact the manufacturer’s behavior exert on consumer 
surplus and social welfare.  
    Preceding model analyses on the competition between e-retailers and 
conventional outlet retailers include Balasubramanian (1998), Cheng and Nault (2007) 
etc2. Chiang, Chhajed, and Hess (2003), Kumar and Ranran (2006), and Nakayama 
(2007) discuss over distribution channel management from the viewpoint of a 
manufacturer. Chiang et al. (2003) and Kumar and Ranran (2006) largely concentrate 
on the factors necessary for the introduction of an e-channel, but ignore the impact of 
such introduction on social welfare. Nakayama (2007) addresses the possibility that the 
introduction of an e-channel would worsen welfare by assuming that the 
manufacturer’s wholesale price for the outlet retailer remains constant before and after 
the introduction. Since this case does not appear enough, we drop the above 
assumption and try to reconsider the necessary conditions for the introduction of an 
e-channel along with the welfare effects of such introduction. 
    We find that, first, the manufacturer will introduce an e-channel only if the 
consumer’s transportation cost is high and e-retailer’s delivery cost is low. Second, if 
all the consumers buy the good from the retail outlets, the introduction of an e-channel 
will decrease the consumer surplus. On the other hand, if only some of the consumers 
buy the good from the retail outlets and the delivery cost is certainly high, the 
introduction will not decrease any consumer’s surplus. Third, the introduction of an 
e-channel will lead to improvements in social welfare only when the delivery cost is 
low. Finally, the introduction of an e-channel can be Pareto efficient even if the 
delivery cost is certainly high. 
    The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we 
present the model and analyze the situation where only outlet retailers exist. In section 
C, we elaborate the necessary conditions for the introduction of an e-channel by the 
manufacturer when the e-channel is available. In section D, we explain the effects of 
the introduction on consumer surplus and social welfare. A brief summary and the 
experimental implication are presented in section E. 
 
2. MODEL 
Consider a linear city model of length 1 where the consumers are uniformly 
distributed with unit density. In this city, a single manufacturer produces a good with 
zero marginal cost and sells it through two outlet retailers denoted by i ( i = 0, 1) that 
are located at points 0 and 1, respectively. The increasing popularity of the Internet 
enables the manufacturer to sell the goods directly to the consumers over the Internet. 
However, a constant delivery cost T is applicable for each unit sold3.  
The surplus of a consumer whose location is given by x∈[0, 1] when buying one 
unit of the good from either outlet retailer i or the e-retailer is as follows: 
(1-1)    v0 = u – p0 – t x, 
(1-2)    v1 = u – p1 – t (1 – x), and     
(1-3)    ve = u – pe,                                               
where vi (ve) denotes the surplus from retailer i (e-retailer); u is the reservation price 
which is assumed to be identical for all consumers for the purpose of simplicity; pi is 
retailer i’s retail price, and pe is the e-retailer’s retail price that is inclusive of T; and t/2 
is the constant transportation cost per unit distance. If a consumer does not make any 
purchase, his surplus is assumed to be zero. Assume that if and only if max{v0, v1, ve}
≧0 holds, the consumer will buy at most one unit of the good from the retailer who 
offers the highest consumer surplus. 
Consider a two-stage game. In the first stage, the manufacturer decides whether or 
not to sell products on line and sets the wholesale price. In the second stage, taking the 
manufacturer’s decisions for given, each retailer sets his own price simultaneously. In 
this section, we analyze the situation where only conventional outlet retailers exist; the 
situation wherein both conventional retailers and e-retailers coexist will be discussed in 
the next section. 
First, let us start our analysis with the consumer’s selection problem when only 






















Then, the consumer’s decision problem is represented as follows:  
if  x≦min{x0, x*}≡ 0xˆ , purchase from retailer 0; 
if  x≧max{x1, x*}≡ 1xˆ , purchase from retailer 1; 
if  x0 < x < x1,  do not make any purchase. 
In this situation, for any given p1, retailer 0’s demand function is given by4 
























































The inverse demand curve refracts at point Pk  ( q0k = (t + p1 – u)/t, p0k = 2u – p1 – t ). 


















It is discontinuous at q0k. By substituting the value of q0k in the above formulas, we can 
obtain the two ends of discontinuity as follows:  
mr+ = u – 2(t + p1 – u) = 3u – 2t – 2p1 
mr- = p1 + t – 4(t + p1 – u) = 4u – 3t – 3p1. 
Retailer 0’s inverse demand and marginal revenue curve are illustrated in FIGURE 15. 
(insert FIGURE 1 here) 
 
Conventional Retailer’s Decision Problem  
Given p1, retailer 0 determines his profit maximization price p0. If the wholesale 
price w is higher than mr+, we obtain retailer 0’s decision problem using the demand 
function (2):  
 .given  for        w.r.t.,))(()(Max  000000 wpt
puwpqwpy −−=−=  
From the maximization condition dy0/dp0 = 0, the retail price is derived as 
(3-1)    .
20
wup +=       
We calculate retailer 1’s price p1 in the same way (see TABLE 1).  
(insert TABLE 1 here) 
 
In this case, the market area of the two retailers separate with each other and some 
consumers are unable to make any purchase from either of the two retailers. We define 
this situation as the “separation equilibrium” (as in FIGURE 2), which is realized if  
(3-2)   mr+= 3u – 2t – (u+ w) < w → u – t < w,    
when the retail price is pS=(u+w)/2. S indicates the situation that the separation 
equilibrium has been realized. 
(insert FIGURE 2 here) 
 
Next, if mr-≦w≦mr+ and the “kinked equilibrium” (see FIGURE 2) is realized, 
retail price (and sales) is set equal to p0k (=2u–p1–t). Since numerous solutions exist for 
any given p1, we suppose a symmetrical equilibrium (p0 = p1) for simplicity6. Hence, 
the retail price is pK=u–t/2 (K indicates the situation that the kinked equilibrium has 
been realized). Note that in this equilibrium, every consumer purchases if  
(4)    mr-≦w≦mr+ → 4u – 3t – 3p1≦w≦3u – 2t – 2p1 → .
2
3 tuwtu −≤≤−   
    Finally, if w < mr- and the “competitive equilibrium” (see FIGURE 2) is 
realized, retailer 0’s profit maximization problem is given as 
. and given for      t.      w.r.
2
))(()(Max  10010000 wppt
tppwpqwpy +−−=−=  




ptwpp ++=  
Retailer 1’s best-response function is obtained as p1(p0)=(w+t+p0)/2 such that the retail 
price is pC=w+t (C indicates the situation that the competitive equilibrium has been 
realized). Every consumer also makes a purchase in this equilibrium if 
(5)  w < mr- → 4u – 3t – 3(w + t) < w → w < u – 
2
3t    
 
Manufacturer’s Decision Problem  
Taking retailers’ action as given, the manufacturer sets his profit- maximization 
wholesale price w in the first stage. Since the two retailers are symmetrical, we omit 
the subscript i in this section so as to avoid any misunderstanding. 
First, when the separation equilibrium is realized if u–t<w, the manufacturer’s 
decision problem is derived from the 2nd row of TABLE 1 as follows: 
.  s.t.        t.      w.r.)(2Max  uwtuw
t
wuwwqS ≤≤−−==π  
Since dπS/dw = (u – 2w)/t = 0, the wholesale price is set as wS = u/2. The equilibrium is 
satisfied if    
(6)   u – t < wS = 
2
u   →  u < 2t.     
Further, the sales for each retailer are calculated as qS = u/(4t) < 1/2. All possible 
solutions for this situation are listed in TABLE 2 for reference. 
(insert TABLE 2 here) 
 
    Second, when the kinked equilibrium is realized if u–3t/2≦w≦ u–t, the 
manufacture’s decision problem is derived from the 3rd row of TABLE 1 as follows: 
.
2
3  s.t.        .     w.r.t2Max  tuwtuwwwqKK −≤≤−==π  
Since dπK/dw = 1 > 0, the wholesale price is set as wK = u–t ( the upper bound of the 
domain [u – 3t/2, u – t] ).  
Finally, when the competitive equilibrium is realized if w < u–3t/2, the 
manufacture’s decision problem is derived from the 4th row of TABLE 1 as follows: 
.
2
30  s.t.        .     w.r.t2Max  tuwwwwqCC −≤≤==π  
Since dπC/dw =1 > 0, the wholesale price is set as u–3t/2. However, since w < u–3 t/2, 
the optimal wC does not exist in this equilibrium7. 
    On comparing the manufacturer’s profits under the separation and kinked 










uKS ππ  
Consequently, the separation equilibrium is chosen. If u > 2t and the separation 
equilibrium is not realized, the kinked (and not the competitive) equilibrium is chosen. 
We thus deduce our first proposition as follows. 
 Proposition 1: If u < 2t, the manufacturer sets the wholesale price as wS = u/2 and the 
separation equilibrium is realized. If u > 2t, the wholesale price is set as wK = u–t and 
the kinked equilibrium (and not the competitive) equilibrium is realized. 
 
The intuition behind this proposition is as follows. In this case, note that the 
manufacturer’s payoff is calculated by multiplying the wholesale price and the retail 
sales volume. When the consumer’s transportation cost is high, it is more profitable for 
the manufacturer to set a high wholesale price, as this will lead to a higher retail price 
and will induce the two retailers to sell the good to only some of the consumers. On the 
other hand, when the transportation cost is sufficiently low, it is profitable to sell the 
good to all consumers. This is so because in this case, the manufacturer’s payoff is 
higher and increases with wholesale price. Therefore, the wholesale price is set at the 
upper bound of the range [u–3t/2, u–t]. However, any wholesale price below u–3t/2 
will never be chosen because then, the reduction in retail price caused by the 
competition between the retailers will not lead to any expansion in retail sales. In other 
words, retail sales will remain constant (=1) in both kinked and competitive 
equilibrium. Therefore, in this model, the manufacturer will never choose a 
competitive equilibrium.  
 
3. INTRODUCTION OF AN E-CHANNEL 
    In this section, we consider the manufacturer’s channel management problem 
when both conventional and e-retailers coexist. Since the delivery cost is included in 
the e-retail price, pe > T, and therefore, if u < T, no consumer would buy the good from 
the e-retailers because pe > u. Therefore, we assume that 
(7)    T < u.      
Additionally, for simplicity, we suppose that the number of e-retailers in the market is 
more than one8. Therefore, as a result of Bertrand competition among the e-retailers, 
the e-retail price is set by9 
(8)    pe = we + T.    
For pe≦u to hold, 
(9)    we ≦ u – T     




If pe≧p1+t, then v1≧ve. In this case, no consumer would purchase the good from 
e-retailers; hence, we assume that pe<p1+t (as in FIGURE 3) so as to ensure that x1e >0. 
(insert FIGURE 3 here) 
 
Conventional Retailer’s Decision Problem 
Taking p1 and pe as given, the retailer 0’s demand function can be written as  























































































which is discontinuous at q0ke. By substituting the value of q0ke in the above formulas, 
we can obtain the two ends of discontinuity as follows: 
mr+ = pe – 2(t + p1 – pe) = 3pe – 2t – 2p1 
mr- = p1+ t – 4(t + p1 – pe) = 4pe – 3t – 3p1. 
To ensure that e-retailers’ sales are positive, we assume that w > mr+10. Retailer 0 
sets his profit maximization price p0 as per the demand function given in (10). 
Therefore, the decision problem is  
. and given  for          w.r.t.))(()(Max  000000 ee pwpt
ppwpqwpy −−=−=  
Since dy0/dp0 = 0, the retail price response function is calculated as 




+=       
The proper retail sales and payoff functions are as follows: 
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−=      
We can also derive the response functions for retailer 1 in the same format if 
(11-4)   mr+ = 2pe – w – 2t < w → pe – t < w.    
If not, e-retailers will make no sales. 
 
Manufacturer’s Decision Problem 
In the first stage, the manufacturer sets the wholesale prices for conventional 
outlet retailers and e-retailers to maximize his profit. From (8), (9) and (11), we get 
the decision problem as follows: 
(12) 
.  and       s.t.
 and   w.r.t.















N indicates the situation that the e-channel is introduced. Here, it must be noted that a 
transaction may occur between conventional retailers and e-retailers when we≠w 11. To 
avoid such arbitration, the manufacturer must set a uniform wholesale price for all the 
retailers. By assuming w=we and substituting the same in the second constraint of (12), 
we get the constraint T<t that contains no variable. Therefore, the manufacturer’s 
decision problem can be rewritten as 
Max πN = we   w.r.t. we   s.t.   we≦u – T. 
Since dπN /dwe=1>0, the wholesale prices are set as follows (see TABLE 2): 
(13)                     weN = wN = u – T.      
By comparing πN with πK when the kinked equilibrium is realized, we get πN – 
πK = u–T–(u–t) = t–T. Therefore, the manufacturer will introduce the e-channel if T < t, 
and will not if T > t. Similarly, when the separation equilibrium is realized (πN – πS = 
u–T–u2/(4t)), the manufacturer introduces the e-channel if u – u2/(4t) > T. 
 
Proposition 2: When the kinked equilibrium is realized in the second stage, the 
manufacturer introduces an e-channel if T<u and T<t. When the separation equilibrium 
is realized, the manufacturer will introduce an e-channel even if the delivery cost is 
certainly high (t < T < u–u2/(4t)).  
 
  Note that when the kinked equilibrium is realized, since the volume of sales will 
remain constant before and after the introduction, the decision problem (whether or 
not to introduce) depends only on the wholesale price level. When T<t, the wholesale 
price after the introduction is higher (wN=u–T>u–t=wK), and it is profitable to 
introduce the e-channel. However when the separation equilibrium is realized, the 
introduction of the e-channel will enable the consumers who were not making any 
purchase before to buy the good from the e-retailers; this has a positive effect on the 
expanding of retail sales. Therefore, even if the wholesale price wN is lower than wS 
when T is certainly high (wN=u–T<u/2=wS, if 2T>u), it is still profitable for the 
manufacturer to introduce an e-channel. 
In fact, according to an investigation conducted by the Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry in 2007, the electronic commerce (EC) rate (i.e., the share of 
online transactions in the total number of transactions) of hotel registration and ticket 
sales in Japan was 2.18% (market size about 508 billion yen) in 2006. This can be 
attributed to the effect of a low delivery cost T that arises from a relatively low 
uncertainty in the quality of the concerned commodities (hotel services and tickets).     
  
4. ECONOMIC WELFARE 
In this section, we analyze the impact of the introduction of an e-channel on 
consumer surplus and social welfare. 
 
Impact on Consumer Surplus 
    We define the consumer surplus CS as 
∫ −−+−= Zee dztzpuqpuCS 0 ,)(2)(  
where z denotes the distance between a consumer and a conventional retail outlet, and 
Z denotes the size of the market area of each outlet. The first term of the above formula 
is the aggregated consumer surplus when the consumers buy the good from e-retailers; 
the second term is the consumer surplus when they buy from conventional retailers.  
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TCSCS SN +−=−=−  
Consumer surplus increases only if T is certainly high (2T > u). 
     
Proposition 3: When the kinked equilibrium is realized, the introduction of an 
e-channel decreases the consumer surplus. On the other hand, the consumer surplus 
will not decrease if the separation equilibrium has been realized in the second stage 
and the delivery cost is certainly high (2T > u).  
 
    The first half of the above proposition is easy to understand if we note that after 
the introduction of the e-channel, (1) there is a zero surplus for consumers who buy the 
good from e-retailers and (2) there is an increase in the conventional retailer’s price. In 
fact, when the kinked equilibrium is realized, the constraint T < t leads to the following 
being held:   
.
22
NK pTutup =−<−=  
The increase in the conventional retailer’s price reduces his market area and the 
consumer surplus. 
    The second half of the proposition claims that when the efficiency of the 
e-channel is low in terms of delivery cost (i.e., the delivery cost is high), the 
introduction of an e-channel by a monopoly manufacturer increases consumer surplus. 
This seemingly paradoxical claim can be explained as follows. First, when the 
separation equilibrium is realized in the second stage before the e-channel is 
introduced, the conventional retailer’s price is set high to compensate for the double 
margin issue. After the introduction, the wholesale price for e-retailers is set as weN = 
u–T, which decreases as T increases. Under the arbitration prevention condition of weN 
= wN, when T is high enough, the wholesale price for conventional retailers wN must to 
be set equal to the wholesale price for e-retailers weN, which leads to a lower outlet 
retail price. When 2T > u, we have 
.
24
3 NS pTuup =−>=  
The decrease in the conventional retailer’s price expands the market area of each outlet 
from u/(4t) to T/(2t). For the consumers who continue making purchases from 
conventional retailers even after the introduction, the surplus increases as the 
conventional retailer’s price decreases. The expansion of the conventional retailer’s 
market area provides the consumers who make fresh purchases from conventional 
retailers with a positive surplus. Additionally, a zero surplus from e-retailers does not 
translate into any decrease in consumer surplus as before the introduction of an 
e-channel, e-retailers did not exist and made no sales. Therefore, we can say that 
though the e-channel is less efficient in terms of a high delivery cost, the introduction 
does not decrease any consumer’s surplus. Because the delivery cost T is high, the 
conventional retailer’s price remains low and his market area increases. Conversely, 
when the delivery cost is low, a high conventional retailer’s price decreases consumer 
surplus. 
 
Impact on Social Welfare 
   Social welfare (gross surplus) is defined as the sum of the manufacturer’s and 
retailer’s profits and consumer surplus. Since the wholesale and retail price levels do 
not affect the gross surplus, we define social welfare as  
∫−−++= Zee tzdzTqqqquTS 010 2)(  
The first term is the consumer’s consumption utility; the second, delivery cost; and the 
third, transportation cost. 











TTuTSTS KN −−=−−+−=−  
Since T < t, we get 
TSN  ⋛ TSK,  if  T ⋚ t/3. 
If the delivery cost T is relatively lower than the transportation cost t, the introduction 
of an e-channel will improve social welfare. 















TTuTSTS SN +−+−−=−+−=−  
Since u–T–u2/(4t) > 0, we conclude that even when the delivery cost is certainly high 
(T > u/2), the introduction of the e-channel improves social welfare. 
 
Proposition 4: When the kinked equilibrium is realized, social welfare is improved 
with the introduction of an e-channel only if the transportation cost is high and 
delivery cost is low (T < t/3). However, when the separation equilibrium is realized, 
the introduction will improve social welfare even when the delivery cost is certainly 
high (2T > u). 
 
   The first half of the above proposition makes a valid claim that social welfare will 
improve if the e-channel is introduced when its efficiency is higher than that of the 
conventional distribution system. However, the second half states a more interesting 
fact that even when the efficiency of the e-channel is certainly low, the introduction of 
an e-channel will still improve social welfare. 
   The intuition can be explained as follows. When the separation equilibrium is 
realized, there are two ways in which the introduction can affect welfare. One is 
increased retail sales－consumers who before the introduction would not make any 
purchase, buying the good from e-retailers. This has a positive effect on social welfare. 
A high transportation cost t (which indicates that the number of consumers who made 
no purchase is large) and low delivery cost T (which implies that the surplus of thee 
consumers who buy the good from e-retailers, given by u–T , is high) make the effect 
on social welfare more pronounced. The other way in which the introduction of an 
e-channel affects social welfare is the change in the size of the conventional retailer’s 
market area. After the introduction, if the conventional retailer’s price is high (2T < u), 
the market area of the conventional retailer reduces from u/(4t) to T/(2t); this results in 
waste in terms of transportation/delivery cost. In other words, some consumers will 
shift from conventional retailers to e-retailers, and will, thus, have to bear a higher 
delivery cost T (as compare to the transportation cost (T/2) they had to bear before the 
introduction of the e-channel). This has a negative effect on social welfare. However, 
when T is sufficiently high (2T > u), the conventional retailer’s market area expands 
from u/(4t) to T/(2t). Further, in this case, the consumers who buy from e-retailers 
would not make purchases before the introduction of the e-channel. This eliminates 
waste and increases social welfare. 
    Herein, the underlying logic can also be explained in the following way. First, we 
define a≡T/t and b≡u/(2t) (as in FIGURE 4),where 0 < a, b < 1 (this is as supposed 
in this model). From the above definition, we get T = at and u = 2bt. Then the effect of 












atatbtTSTS SN −+−=−+−=−  
Further, for t > 0, if we denote g (a, b)≡8b–4a+3a2–7b2, TSN ≶ TSS  iff g(a, b) ≶ 0. 
The function g (a, b) is convex on a and concave on b and holds an saddle point at 
(2/3, 4/7). 
    From the introduction condition of u–u2/(4t)–T > 0, we get 
 h(a, b)≡2b – b2 – a > 0 ⇒ 1 – ( 1 – a)1/2 < b < 1 + (1 – a)1/2. 
Here, since 1+(1–a)1/2 > 1, the parameter range within which the manufacturer can 
introduce an e-channel when the separation equilibrium is realized is D = {1–(1–a)1/2, 
0 < a < 1, 0 < b < 1}. The loci that lie within D and satisfy g (a, b) are derived as 
.
7





2aaa +−−>−−  
b = [4–(16–28a+21a2)1/2]/7 does not lie within D. Therefore,  
   TSN ≶TSS  if  b ≷ 
7
2128164 2aa +−+   
holds within D.  
 
(insert FIGURE 4 here) 
 
    As discussed above, by keeping the other parameters constant, we can observe 
that when the delivery cost T is sufficiently low, social welfare increases with the 
introduction of an e-channel because the positive effect of the growth in retail sales 
surpasses the waste encountered in terms of transportation/delivery cost. When T is 
moderately high, both the positive and negative effects are diminished. However, if T 
very high, the negative effect is eliminated while the positive effect is only further 
diminished; this, therefore, does lead to improvements in social welfare.  
    Finally, from Proposition 3 we have that the consumer surplus does not decrease 
after the introduction of the e-channel if 2T>u. By comparing the profits of 








uy =<=  
This shows that the conventional retailer’s profit increases with the introduction of an 
e-channel. At the same time, although the e-retailer’s profit is zero, technically, there 
has been no decrease in the profit after the introduction because before the 
introduction, the e-retailers did not exist (i.e., profit is zero). Furthermore, a monopoly 
manufacturer will never introduce an e-channel if it is not profitable. Therefore, when 
2T > u, the introduction of an e-channel is Pareto efficient. If 2T > u is expressed by a 
> b, Pareto efficiency can shown in Figure 4. 
 
Proposition 5: When the separation equilibrium is realized, the introduction of the 
e-channel is Pareto efficient if 2T > u. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
    This paper considers the conditions under which an e-channel can be introduced   
and the impact of the introduction on consumer surplus and social welfare from the 
viewpoint of a manufacturer. From Proposition 1, we know that when only 
conventional retailers exist and the consumer’s transportation cost is high (low), the 
manufacturer will set his wholesale price such that the separation equilibrium (kinked 
equilibrium) will be realized at the retailing stage. If the separation equilibrium is 
realized, some consumers are unable to make any purchase. Further, as show in 
Proposition 2, the increasing popularity of the Internet implies that the manufacturer 
will introduce an e-channel only if consumer’s transportation cost is high and 
e-retailer’s delivery cost is low. This is obvious given that in this case, the e-channel 
will be much more efficient than the market where only conventional retailers exist.  
Proposition 2 provides a good explanation as to why Japan’s EC rate is much 
lower than that of the U.S. Although the U.S. is 20 times larger than Japan in terms 
of land area, the number of conventional retail outlets per unit area in Japan is 
remarkably higher. Consequently, in Japan, the distance between outlets is shorter 
and the constant transportation cost t per unit distance (between the outlets) is lower 
as compared to the delivery cost T. As a result, a significantly higher percentage of 
consumers continue buying from conventional retailers. In this situation, future 
estimates of increases in online sales are lower and also the incentive for a 
manufacturer to introduce an e-channel is smaller.   
    When the kinked equilibrium is realize, the introduction of an e-channel 
decreases the consumer surplus as follows. First, the e-retail price is set equally to the 
reservation price and consequently, the surplus of consumers who make purchase 
from e-retailers is zero. Further, the rise in e-retail price leads to a sharp increase in 
the outlet retail price. Therefore, the surplus of consumers buying the good from the 
conventional retail outlets decreases after the introduction. However, this conclusion 
strongly depends on the supposition that there is a monopoly manufacturer. 
Consumer welfare can be improved by decreasing the e-retail price if many 
manufacturers exist in the market. On the other hand, when the separation 
equilibrium is realized, consumer surplus increases even when the delivery cost is 
certainly high. Because the wholesale price for e-retailers weN (=u–T) decreases as T 
increases, under the arbitration prevention condition of weN = wN, when T is high, the 
manufacturer has to set the wholesale price for the conventional retailers as the same 
low as weN. Resultantly, this lower outlet retail price increases the consumer surplus. 
As presented in Proposition 3, this lead to an interesting conclusion in that none of 
any consumer’s surpluses decreases even when a less efficient e-channel is 
introduced by the monopoly manufacturer for profit maximization. However, the 
manufacturer will not introduce an e-channel if it is not profitable; this implies that 
the manufacturer and consumers share a mutual interest in this case.  
    The first half of Proposition 4 is very obvious given that the introduction of an 
e-channel will improve social welfare if it is more efficient than the existing market 
system where only conventional retailers exist. However, when the separation 
equilibrium is realized and delivery cost is certainly high, the introduction leads to 
consumers, who before its introduction would not make any purchase, buying the 
good from e-retailers. Profits from these new sales cover the losses incurred because 
of the transportation/delivery cost and social welfare is improved. Finally, because 
the outlet retailers’ profits also increase, as stated by Proposition 5, even when the 
efficiency of the e-channel is certainly low, the introduction of an e-channel by a 
monopoly manufacturer is still Pareto efficient. 
    In this paper, we suggest a benchmark model to analyze the conditions under 
which an e-channel can be introduced along with the impact of its introduction on 
consumer surplus and social welfare. With regarded to the future research direction, 
first, we would like to study the outcomes of allowing the conventional retailers to 
relocate their outlets after the introduction. Second, we would like to study a market 
where there is competition between two or more manufacturers. Finally, we intend to 
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 Separation  Kinked  Competitive 
p (u+w)/2 u-t/2 w+t 
q (u-w)/(2t) 1/2 1/2 
y (u-w)2/(4t) (2u-t-2w)/4 t/2 
condition u-t < w u-3t/2≦w≦u-t w < u-3t/2 
 


















If the outlet 0 set his retail price lower than P0, then e-retailer’s sales would be zero. 
 


















 Before the introduction 
After the introduction 
 Separation(S) Kinked(K) 
w u/2 u-t u-T 
we --- --- u-T 
p 3u/4 u-t/2 u-T/2 
pe --- --- u 
q u/(4t) 1/2 T/(2t) 
qe --- --- (t-T)/t 
π u2/(4t) u-t u-T 
y u2/(16t) t/4 T2/(4t) 
ye --- --- 0 
CS u2/(16t) t/4 T2/(4t) 
TS  7u2/(16t)  u-t/4 u-T+3T2/(4t) 
Condition u < 2t u > 2t 
u > T, t > T (Kinked) 
T < u-u2/(4t) (Separation)
 



























Introduction condition  
a = 2b-b2 
Improved territory in the 
a = b 
TSN < TSS 
TSN > TSS 
b=[4+(16-28a+21a2)1/2]/7 
b=[4-(16-28a+21a2)1/2]/7
Figure 4 The change on social welfare with the introduction  
when Separation equilibrium is realized
                                                         
1 Rakuten is one of the general merchandise retailers who only sell their products online.  
 
Department stores such as Takashimaya, Yiseten, and Mistukoshi, and large specialized stores  
 
such as Muruzen, Kinokuniya, and Shinseido are examples of retailers who sell their products  
 
both online and offline. 
 
2 A number of preceding researches have used the empirical approach. For example, Brynjolfsson  
 
and Smith (2000) analyzed the American books/music CDs market; Degeratu, Rangaswamy, and  
 
Wu (2000) studied the food and grocery market; Lynch and Ariely (2000) analyzed consumer  
 
action by constructing an online wine market simulation; Clemons, Hann, and Hitt (2002)  
 
researched the online air-ticket market; Brynjolfsson, Hu, and Smith (2003) argued the impact  
 
of the assortment of online bookstores on consumer surplus; and Morton, Zettelmeyer, and  
 
Risso (2001) studied the automobile market. Furthermore, Morita and Nishimura (2002) analyzed  
 
the use of websites by Japanese consumers before the purchase of an automobile. 
 
3 E-retailers are unlike conventional retail outlets, and consumers may feel naive and insecure when  
 
making a purchase from e-retailers. This disutility may arise from the fact that the delivery is not  
 
immediate or from quality concerns as physical inspection of the actual purchased good is not  
 
possible. T can also be explained as the cost arising from such disutility (for reference, one can  
 
see Aiura (2007), which deals with a similar issue). For the purpose of the embodiment, we  
 
simply consider T as a delivery cost in this paper. 
 
4 The last line in equation (2) indicates the situation in which all the consumers make their purchase  
 
from retailer 0 and retailer 1 losses his market completely. We assume that this never occurs. 
 
5 If we assume that q1=1- 1xˆ , the same theory can be applied to retailer 1. 
 
6 Such symmetrical equilibrium can be realized by territorial restriction, wherein the manufacturer  
 
sets the center of the market as the boundary for each outlet retailer. 
 
7 If w = u-3t/2, the manufacturer’s payoff will be πC = u-3t/2 < u-t = πK. 
 
8 In the situation where a franchise fee can not be levied, the manufacturer prefers to deal with  
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
multiple retailers to avoid the double-margin issue if the manufacturer is able to determine the  
 
number of e-retailers it has to deal with. 
 
9 Equation 8 is derived by the zero-profit condition ye = (pe - T - we)qe = 0. 
 
10 If mr+≦w≦mr-, the kinked equilibrium is realized, and if w < mr-, the competitive equilibrium is  
 
realized. As mentioned in the previous section, since all consumers buy the good from the outlet  
 
retailers, sales of e-retailers are zero (see FIGURE 3). 
 
11 In the case where retailers see the good(s) both online and offline, the retailers can always move  
 
the inventory meant for online sales to their retail outlets. If such arbitration does take place, the  
 
delivery cost is supposed to be lower owing to the economics of scale. For simplicity, we assume  
 
that this delivery cost is zero. 
 
 
 
